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INTEGRITY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
INVESTIGATION
Rose Gill Hearn*

I am so delighted to be here with Dean Feerick. I don't know that I
can bring any wisdom to him but I certainly always learn from him
whenever I am with him. I am here to speak about the Department of
Investigation, which plays a significant role in the maintenance of
integrity in New York City's government.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION

The Department of Investigation derives its power from the New
York City Charter and various Executive Orders that have been
promulgated over the years. DOI, as it is known by its friends and
foes alike, has the responsibility for the investigation and elimination
of corruption, criminal activities, conflicts of interest, unethical
conduct, gross waste or abuse, other misconduct and incompetence by
City employees or anyone doing business with the City.
We also conduct background investigations of employees to be
appointed to or holding positions of high responsibility within the City
government and of vendors or contractors who obtain large-dollaramount contracts from the City. We are the investigative arm of the
Conflicts of Interest Board. Present today are Professor Bruce Green,
who is a member of the Board and Joan Salzman, who is Counsel to
the Board. We collaborate often and successfully with the Board.
There are approximately seventy City agencies and roughly 400,000
City employees; these are rough numbers because they are hard to
tabulate accurately. The New York City government is the secondlargest government in the country, second only to the federal
government.
DOI plays a unique and delicate role in City government, in that it
is part of the City government but also monitors City government.
DOI represents a law enforcement presence to those who work within
the City's vast bureaucracy and to those who do business with the
City. It is a challenging mission and a dynamic concept that we think
* This essay represents a lightly edited and footnoted version of my comments at the
Integrity and the Law Symposium at Fordham University School of Law on February
7, 2003. I would like to thank the former and current members of my staff for their
assistance in compiling some of this information, including Elizabeth Glazer and
David Burke.
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is central to an effective democratic society, namely the maintenance
of integrity, trust, and fairness.
I know that having DOI as an independent watchdog within City
government is unique because we regularly receive officials from
foreign countries and other states who come and want to spend one,
two, or three days with members of my office to learn exactly how we
are set up and the powers and tools that we have to maintain integrity
in the City government. These visitors from other nations and cities
take back to their venues the concepts on which DOI is based.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION

The origin and history of DOI is very interesting and it explains its
mission and purpose. The office is approximately 130 years old. It
was created in 1873 by the State Legislature as a result of the
enormous scandals that took place during the term of Abraham
Oakley Hall, the seventy-ninth mayor of the City of New York.'
These scandals involved millions of dollars pouring into corrupt hands
from extortion and swindles involving every conceivable public and
private project going on at that time.
In 1871, the New York Times estimated that in three years more
than $200 million had been stolen or extorted in the City government.2
The most corrupt hands belonged to four people: (1) Mayor Hall; (2)
the Comptroller, described in the paper as being "without an honest
instinct in his nature"; (3) the Chamberlain, now known as the
Commissioner of Finance; and (4) William "Boss" Tweed, the
notorious political leader who was also the Commissioner of the
Department of Public Works.3
Mayor Hall was tried, pleaded ignorance, and, after three hung
juries, was not convicted. He happily completed his term in office. 4
The Comptroller escaped to France with $6 million, forfeiting an
additional $1 million in bail money.5 The Chamberlain fled to
Canada, later returning and paying a settlement of $400,000.6 Tweed,
though charged in 1871, continued in office until he was convicted at
his second trial on 204 counts, for which he received twelve years in
jail.7 After serving one year, he was released following a successful
appeal.8 Jailed again on civil fraud charges in 1875, Tweed was
1. Richard R. Winslow & David W. Burke, Rascals, Rouges, & Heroes: A
History of the New York City Department of Investigation; 1873 to 1993, at 1 (1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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allowed to go home every day for lunch.9 Then, one day in December
1875, he skipped lunch and instead escaped to Cuba, then later to
Spain!' ° A year later, he was deported back to New York, where he
died in prison owing an $8 million civil judgment."
In 1884, after a heated debate, the State Legislature gave the
Department of Investigation, then known as the Department of
Accounts, the power to issue subpoenas and take testimony under
oath. 2 The power to subpoena, previously granted only to legislative
commissions, enormously increased the Department's ability to probe
all phases of municipal government and its administration.
III. THE DEPARTMENT TODAY

The DOI Commissioner is appointed by the Mayor. The DOI
Commissioner's relationship to the Mayor has always been the subject
of varying opinions and some scrutiny. The debate has centered
around the concept that an independent, progressive, conscientious
fact finder at DOI may be dangerous to the health and survival of
political leaders and their associates.
And so the need for
independence-from the Mayor, his administration, and its
agencies-has always been present.
That is why the DOI
Commissioner is the only Commissioner whose appointment by the
Mayor must be approved by the City Council. 3
That said, DOI fairly and appropriately plays a supportive and
helpful role to the Administration by making sure that people
working for and dealing with City government act with integrity.
Moreover, realistically, DOI is a part of the Administration. We
need resources from the Office of Management and Budget. We need
cooperation from every Commissioner and every Deputy Mayor, as
well as the backing of the Mayor as we carry out our mission
throughout the City.
Returning to the agency's history for a moment, eventually, as time
went on, Inspectors General were appointed in most, if not all, City
agencies to ensure integrity compliance by serving as internal
watchdogs for the agencies. Those "IG"s, as they are called, reported
to the heads of their respective agencies.
Following a series of municipal scandals in the 1980s, the
effectiveness of an internal IG was called into question. The internal
IG -hired and fired by the agency, with the agency knowing his or her
every move and docket, setting his or her staff and budget
parameters-was found to be an insufficient tool for ferreting out
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
New York City Charter § 31.
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corruption.
In other words, the IGs lacked the necessary
independence from their respective agencies to carry out their
mission.
Thus, in 1986, Mayor Koch signed an executive order bringing the
City's IG system under DOI.14 From that point on, all IGs became
employees of DOI, reporting only to the DOI Commissioner, fully
independent of the agencies they monitor.
From my observations this past year, while this system is clearly
preferable to a system of internal IGs, its one disadvantage is that the
IGs now must struggle to get in and stay plugged into what is
happening inside the agencies, which is obviously key to monitoring
agency activities.
The Department of Investigation is also the agency to whom
whistleblowers throughout the City must come with knowledge or
complaints about corruption. The Whistleblower Law, which is
section 12-113 of the Administrative Code, obligates City employees
to report corruption.15 It also protects City employees who make such
reports against retaliation by the agency or by the employer.
We have a fairly steady stream of employees who come to us with
information.
We closely scrutinize these matters and are not
permitted to let the agency know the identity of the whistleblower. If
an agency takes action against an employee who has reported
something to the DOI, we are obligated by law to take up the case
against the agency and examine whether the retaliation was based on
the whistleblower claim; if so, it is our obligation to direct the agency
to reinstate the person or undo the retaliation.
I would like to mention one other important aspect of DOI, which
is the Independent Private Sector Inspector General, or IPSIG,
program. When a company or a project needs close scrutinymeaning, for example, constant review of books and records or on-site
inspections--because the company has been discovered to have an
integrity problem, or because the project is so huge or susceptible to
corruption hazards that DOI has determined that it needs the kind of
constant monitoring for which we do not have resources, DOI in
conjunction with the Corporation Counsel's office will appoint an
IPSIG to monitor the project in lieu of DOI, although the IPSIG
monitor will report exclusively to DOI on a regular basis.
Let me give you an example of a huge project that was monitored
by IPSIGs for corruption prevention:
Ground Zero.
After
September 11, 2001, literally hundreds of millions of dollars were
poured into the deconstruction and cleanup at Ground Zero,
beginning September 12, 2001. The vast amounts of money that were
14. Exec. Order No. 105 (Dec. 26, 1986) amending Exec. Order No. 16 (July 26,
1978), availableat http://www.nyc.gov/html/doi/htmwhistblr-eo16.ntml#eo78.
15. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-113 (2002).
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going to the contractors with such speed created a situation that we
thought called for IPSIG monitors. The Ground Zero site was
divided into four sections, and four of the largest construction
managers were each given a quarter of the site to clean up. DOI put
four IPSIGs in place to monitor the four construction areas, twentyfour hours a day, including weekends, to monitor the activity at the
site and serve as deterrents against an infiltration of organized crime
activity or corruption.
Who are these IPSIGs? They are specialists of all kinds, including
former law enforcement officials, accountants, computer experts,
environmental and construction experts.
They are basically "integrity monitors" selected by DOI and
Corporation Counsel based on whether they are qualified and
experienced to handle the particular project.
Turning back to the main investigative work of DOI, I would like to
highlight some of the notable cases DOI has undertaken in the last
year, just to bring some of these concepts to life:
9 In February 2002, we arrested eighteen current and former tax
assessors from the Department of Finance. They are the individuals
responsible for calculating the assessments on all commercial and
residential real property in Manhattan. They were taking bribes in
exchange for lowering assessments. The scheme cost the City about
$40 million a year over the last four years alone. All have pled guilty
at this point.
0 In June 2002, we arrested nineteen out of approximately twentyfour plumbing inspectors in the Department of Buildings, who were
also taking bribes in exchange for signing off on projects. The
plumbing inspectors are responsible for all types of construction
inspections, ranging from the big commercial projects, gas line
inspections, all the way down to small projects in private homes and
apartment buildings.
e We also investigated and participated in the prosecution of New
York City Councilman Angel Rodriguez from Brooklyn, who was in
the running for Speaker of the Council. He and a co-defendant pled
guilty to bribery charges and was sentenced to fifty-two months
imprisonment. He approached a constituent who wanted to do a real
estate project in Brooklyn, and indicated that he would back the
constituent's plan in exchange for about $2.5 million. He demanded it
be paid to him in the form of several complex, convoluted-and
therefore, I guess he thought, not particularly traceable-real estate
transactions. But the constituent came forward and wore a wire for
several months, and captured the whole thing on tape.
My office does as much as it can by way of corruption prevention,
operational audits, constant meetings with the Commissioners,
Deputy Commissioners, and others at the various agencies, to ensure
that things are going smoothly. And, of course, we also operate like a
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police precinct in some respects, responding to reports of corruption
and situations as quickly as possible.
It really is an interesting job because DOI spans the entire
jurisdiction of the City of New York, from buildings, to finance, parks,
construction, and the schools. It's quite fascinating.
I am pleased to report that if you consider its size, there is actually
relatively little corruption among the City workforce.

